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In the Supreme .Court 
of the State of Utah 
MODESTA MARIE BER'L'AGNOLI, 
ANSI;~L H. PRA'L'T and RHODA 
R. P H A 'l' r_t_' , h i s w i f e, L. M. 
SPHOlJL and BELVA SPHOUL, 
his wife, C. A. CHIDEt:;rrER an(l 
.n~SNU~ R CHJDES'l'l,~R, his wife, 
Pctit,ioners, 
-vs.-
HOX CLAHI£NCE _K BAKEH, 
liOK. .JOSI1~PH G. .JEPPSON, 
lLO~. ROALD A. HOGENSON", 
110~. .J. ALLA:t'\ CROCKET'l', 
HON. RAY VAN COT'L', .JR., ancl 
liON. A. H. ELLE'l'T, in their 
eapaeity as ,Judges of the District 
Court of Uw 'l'hinl .Judieial Dis-
trid of tlw State of Utah, in and 
i'or Salt Lake County, and 'l'HI'~ 
BOARD OF Ji~DUCA'l'ION OF' 
S.\L'l' LAKE~ CT'I'Y, a public eor-
poration, 
llespondcnts. 
BHIKF' OF P"B~TI'l'IONERS 
1 fiS'l'OHY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Ca:,;e No. 
7408 
1. 'L'he respondent, Board of Education ol' Salt 
Lake City (hereinafter designated "SCHOOL BOARD") 
is a pnhlie corporation organi7.ed and Pxisting uwln 
and hy virtue of thP laws of th1~ State of Utah. 'l'lw 
rPsptmtlents, Hon. Clarence E. Baker, Hon .• J oseplt 0. 
1 
.Jepp::;oll, Hem. Roald A. Hoge11::;on, lion .• J. Allan Croe-
kett, lion. Ra? \Tan Cott, .Jr., and Hon. A. H. Ellett 
(hereinafter eollectivt~ly designatPd "D l S 'l' RIC T 
COURT") wen~ at all timns hen•inaftPr lllPntionc~d and 
are now regularly eleeted, qualific~d and ac·ting judg(';.; 
of the District Court of the 'rhird .Tudic·ial J)i;.;trid of 
the State o!' Utah, in and for Salt l .. ah County. 
'l'he petitimwr, 1\l odesta 11m·ie Hc>rtagnoli, JS thn 
principal owner in fee simple, and thu other rwtitionen; 
elaim an interest (sueh intPrPst hc•ing lH·n•inaftpr de-
serihed) in tlw following deserihed trac·t and ]Hll'Cf)l or 
land situate in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
Commcmeing at the Southeast corner of Lot ~. 
Block 14, Five Acre Plat "C", Big Field Survey, 
and running thence North 89 deg. 49' 10" \Ve>:~t 
762.24 feet; thence North 0 deg. 03' 32" \Vest 
578.74 feet; thence South 89 deg. 42' 16" Bast 
628.35 feet; thenee South 88 deg. 2G' ()(j" Eas~ 
132.45 feet; thence South 0- cleg·. 12' 32" J<';ast 
57 4.29 feet to point of beginning. 
2. On September 7, l 949, the School Board eom-
meneed an adion known a])(l designated as Case Nu. 
87,004 (hereinafter designated "CONDI~MNATION 
ACTION", in the Distriet Court of the Third Judicial 
Distriet of the State of Utah in and for Salt Lake County, 
agaim;t the petiti01wrs and Zions Savinf,?;s Bank & Trn..;t 
Company, a corporation of Utah, by filing with the Clerk 
of said Court its vc>rific>d eornplaint (petitioners' exhibit 
"2") praying for judgment of said Court whereby the 
above described tract and parcel of land would be con-
demned for the> nse and benefit of said Sehool Board. 
2 
Nummom; was duly Sl~rvPd upon eaeh and all ol' ilw said 
petition('l'S and the said L;ions Savings Bank & 'Pnut 
Compm1~·. Within the time allow<_•d L.r law, the petition-
ers appeared in said action by counsel, and serv<~d and 
filed their g<·neral and special denmner (Peti tiouers' 
Exhihii "i~") to the complaint in said adion, on the fol-
lowing grotnHls: 
"1. 'l'hat the said complaint does not allege 
!'ads ~;uf'ficient to eom;titntt> a cause of action 
against these d<>mmTing d<d'Pn<lants, or any of 
tlwm. 
'' ·J 'i hat t!H' said complaint is uncertain Ill 
III<> foll<ming n~speets and particulars: 
(a) 'l'ha t ihe said complaint does not al-
lPg<:~ m· state hy proper teehnical and legal 
d<·:·:eription th(~ part of the real property in-
yo]n•d in this action and deserihed in para-
grapll ~ thPrPol', whil'h is lo<·atPd within tht~ 
nmni(~ipallimits of Salt LakP City Corporation, 
and the part ihereol' which is loeated without 
the munieipal limits of said Ralt Lake City and 
\':ithin the limits of' Salt Lake County, Utah. 
(h) That the said eomplaint does not allege 
or state tlw type and natnre of tlH• sehool house 
proposed to he en'cted upon thP said land de-
scribed in paragraph 2 tht~reof, distinguishing 
between high sehool, junior high sehool, or ele-
mental')' sl'hool use. 
(c) '!'hat the said eomplaint does not allege 
or state the number of students that will b'~ 
aceommodatPd in said proposed school house to 
b(~ erPcted upon saicl land dt•serilwd in para-
grapll ~ then~of. 
(d) That the said eomplaint d<ws not allege 
or stnte the partienlar anrl specific intended use 
., 
c) 
o[ saiu real property by the plaiutiff with rc-
:,;ped to the loeation of the proposed school 
house thereon, the part thereof which it is 
proposed to use for play ground and recrea-
tional area in connection \Yi th said schoiJl 
house, and the part thereof which will not be 
snhjected to use for thr aforpsaid purposes. 
"3. 'l'hat the said eomplaint is ambiguous for 
the reasons set forth and alleged in :,;nil-para-
graphs (a), (b), (c), all<l (d) of paragraph 2 
hereof." 
~ r L'altaneously with the service and filing of said de-
i llitl't'er, said petitioners served and filed thPir notice o1 
iJlhe~ttion (petitioners' Exhibit "4") to movE~ the Court 
l'ur an order requiring said School Board to make ih 
t'<):' plaint in sai<l <·ondemnation action more dnJiuit<~ and 
~"n.aill in tlte following parii<~nlar:-:: 
"1. 'J1hat tltn plaintiff lw n~quired' to allPJ.\·r· 
al\(1 ::;tate in its eomplaint by proper tPehnical and 
legal desniption the part of the real property iH-
volv<·<l in this adion and descrilwd in paragraph 
2 of its eomJJlaint which is loeated within tllt• 
mnnieipal limits of Salt Lak<~ City Corporation, 
all([ tlw part tlwreof "'ltieh is Joeatnd without tltt' 
mtmieipallimits of sai<l Salt Lalw City and witlti:1 
thP limit:,; of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
"2. 'J'hat tlw plaintiff he reqni red to all e·~·<~ 
and :-tatn in it:- eomplaint tlw typ<~ an<l natun~ o'i' 
t.lw s<~ltool bouse proposPd to be <~l'<'d<'d upon tltt~ 
sai<l land desnilw<l in paragraph 2 of plainti f'f':.: 
<~ompJaint, <li~.:ting-ui:-hing- \\'hdher tlH· sai<l :-eltool 
house will be usc>d for high school purpo:ws, 
junior high seltool purpo:-<•s, or el<•.ntPntary sel10ol 
pnrposPs. 
"::L '!'hat iiH• plainti f'f be n~qnin•d to alleg'J 
aud state in its eomp1aint th<~ nmuhr>r of stn<]Pnts 
1 
"! 
that will be accommodated in ~aid proposed school 
homw to be en~cte<l upon said land described in 
paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint. 
"4. rrhat the plaintiff he required to alleg~ 
and state in its complaint the particular and ::;pe-
eific intended n::;<~ of said real property by the 
11laintiff with resrwct to th0 location of the prq-
po~Pd ::;ehool hous<~ thereon, the part thereof' 
whit·h it i~ propose<l to u::;e for play ground and 
rPnE>ational arPa in eonlledion with said school 
house, and the part th0reof whieh will not he sub-
jedt>cl to use for tlw afor<->said purposes." 
On the fith day of OetohE>r, 1949, the said School 
Boanl ~<'rverl upon tlw petitioners and filed in said 
Court and cam;p its motion (pditioners' Exhibit "6") 
for an onler 11nder Seetion 104-61-5 Utah Code 1943 
authorizing entry upon said real property for the pur-
pose ol' making examinations, ::;urv0ys and maps thereof. 
il. B~- t•on~C'nt of ( jourt and counsel, on the 7ttl 
da~· of (ktolwr, 1 D49, the said motion of tht> School 
Boanl (p<>titionC'rs' Exhibit "6") came on for argument, 
pm~uant to notiee (]wtitionpr~' Exhibit "8"), befor~ 
the Honorahh~ .J. Allan Crockett, a JndgP of said Di;:;-
trid Court. lTpon stipulation of counsel, ma<l<~ in opeH 
<·ourt, tht> al'on•suid denmrr<'r and motion of petitimH•r, 
(pt'titimwr~' F~xhihits ":3" nnd "4") Wf~n~ argued sinml-
tanPon~l~- witl1 th<~ argnmPnt ol' the motion or said 
N<"hool Bonnl (pPtitionPrs' 11~xhihit "G"). Upon ron-
t•lnsion ol' said argument, the matters were ~uhmitted ill 
the Court, and tlwn•arter the saicl Court, aet"ing hy aml 
tl1rough ~aid Honorable J. Allan Croekett, a .Tn<lgP 
tlwr0of, macl£', <>ntcr£'<1 and filed its minute or<lPrs oYer-
ruling the general and :,;peeial demUJTPI' of the petitioners 
(petitioner:,.;' ~xhibit ":1"), denying the i'aid petitioner:,.;' 
motion for an order ( prtitioners' ~xhibi t "4 ") rcq ni r-
ing the said School Board to make it:,.; eomplaint moru 
definite and certain, and granting the motion of sai,J 
School Board for entry upon the above described real 
property for purposes of making exa!llinations, i'nrvey..;; 
and maps. '!,hereafter, on the 10th day of Octoher, 194~), 
the said Honorable .T. Allan Croekett, in his capacity as 
,J ndge afore~mid, signc,d and filed a file order (plaintiffs' 
ljJxhibit "11 ") affirming and including the matters d~::­
termined hy his aforesaid minute orderf.>. 
4. On the 13th day of Oetober, 1949, the petitioners 
filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the Sta~e 
of Utah their petition praying for an alternative writ 
of Prol!ihition dire(~ted to the Distrid Court and the 
Ndwol Board. lTpon consideration of said petition by 
tlw llonorahle Chi(~f .Justiee of the Supreme Court, it 
was ordPrt>d that :,.;aid alternativ(• writ uf Prohibition 
i:,;KliP, and under da!e of OdobPr 1:1, 1949, the same wa:,.; 
i:--:Klll'd by tiH~ ClPrk of :,.;aid Snpremn ConrL By :,.;aid 
writ thP :,.;aid Disiri(~t Court and Uw judges thereof 
1n~n· (~ommanded to refrain from any fn rtlwr proet>ed-
ing:,.; ill :,.;ai(l ('O!ldPmllaiion adi()]}' im;ofar UK it {Wrtain:-; 
to real propert~· loeatPd without th<' munieipal limits of 
Salt Lake Cit~:. nntil furtfw1· ord<'r ol' Haid NuprenH~ 
Court. fSeiTi<'e or thP \Hit was mad(' upon the Disti·ict 
Court and the School Board on the 14th day of Octolwr, 
1949. rl'he rt'tnrn day of said writ \\'as OetolH~r :M, 194D, 
at 10:00 o 'eloek A.l\f. In I'C'KJlOll~P to ;-;:aid alh~rnativ(~ 
writ of Prohibition, respondents have filed their (a) 
demurrer to the petition, (b) motion to quash tlle said 
alternative writ, and (c) answer to said petition. By 
stipulation of counsel signed and filed on October 21, 
1949, a map of Salt Lake City, cPrtified hy Vv. D. Beer:-:, 
City lj~ngineer (hereinafter designat0d "School Hoard 
~I ap ") was made part of the n~cord in said aetion. B ;· 
said stipulation also there was made part of the record, 
~mbject to tlw petitioners' objection that the same a1~ 
immaterial, (a) map of Salt Lake City showing junior 
high school zones, (b) drawing entitled ''Map of South-
<'a::;tern Salt Lake City" showing the homes immediai<>l~­
adjaeent to proposed junior high school ::;ite, and (e) 
drawing entitled "Pupil Distribution in Sonth0ast<·rn 
Salt Lalw City as p£'r 1948 S<·hool CE>nsn:-;". 
STA'l'El\JEN1' OF ]'ACTS 
1. The tract and parcel of land hereinbefore par-
ticularly described is situate at the Northeast corner of 
the intersection of South 19th East Street and 17th 
South Street. The area is shown in hatched lines on 
the Sehool Board Map, and is also delineated npon 
petitioners' F~xhi hit "1 ", being an official plat of the 
South half of Block 14, J1'ive Aere Plat "C", Big Field 
Survey, prepared by the County Recorder of Salt Lakt> 
County, Utah. This parcel of land contains 10.12 acres, 
ancl is situate partly within and partly without the mn-
nicipallimits of Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation 
of tlw first elas:-; of the State of Fiah. Ac<~onling to thl' 
rpenrcl:-; in the offi<·<• ol' thP ('onn(~· R<•eonkr ol' Salt 
Lake County, Utah, 6.07 acres of said land are situat2 
without the municipal limits of said Salt Lake City and 
within Salt Lake County, Utah and also within the limits 
of Granite School District, a public corporation of the 
State of Utah, located in said County. Also according 
to the records in the office of the County Recorder of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, approximately 4.05 acres of 
said land are situate within the municipal limits of said 
Salt Lake City. According to the claim of the respond-
ents, the total area of the land involved is 10.1 acre~, 
with 4.51 acres being located within the municipal limit::; 
of Salt Lake City and 5.59 acres being located without 
the municipal limits of Salt Lake City. The part of the 
land without the municipal limits of Salt Lake City and 
the part of the land within the municipal limits of Salt 
Lake City are contiguous and adjacent, and together 
form one parcel of land, as hereinabove particularly de-
scribed. The area delineated on the School Board map 
in yellow, outlined in red, constitutes territory within 
Salt Lake County and also within Granite School Dis-
trict. The exterior municipal boundary lines of Salt 
Lake City Corporation are delineated on said map in 
red. 
2. The petitioner, Modesta Marie Bertagnoli, is the 
principal owner in fee simple of the tract and parcel of 
land sought to he condemned. The interests of petitioners 
Ansel H. Pratt and Rhoda R. Pratt, his wife, L. :M. 
Sproul and Belva Sproul, his wife, and C. A. Chidester, 
and Jessie R. Chidester, hi::; wifP, ari::;e through conflict 
of houwlary aml fL•Iwe lin(~S oi" the tract and parcel of 
8 
land above described with adjoining :and adjacent areas 
owned by these latter petitioners. '!'hey vYere joined as 
parties defendant in the condemnation action, in order 
to eliminate certain clouds on and conflicts in title. 
:3. The ~e!Jool Board seeks to exercise its right of 
eminPnt <lolllain and to eondemn the land of the peti-
tioners in order to secure an area upon which to con-
struct, operate, and maintain a ;junior high school whieh 
will form part of the school system operated by tlw 
Rchool Board under the authority conferred upon it by 
tlw Constitution and statutes of tlw State of Utah. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
''Private property shall not be taken or 
<lamaged for public use without just compensa-
1 ion." (Artitle I, SPction 22, Constitution of 
Utah.,) 
"In cities of the first and second class, the 
public school system shall be controlled by the 
Board of Education of such cities, separate and 
apart from the counties in which said cities are 
located." (Article X, Section 6, Constitution of 
Utah.) 
STATUTORY REFERENCES 
''Subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
the right of eminent domain may be exercised in 
h<>half of the following public uses: * '~ * (3) 
Public buildings and grounds for the use of any 
(~onnty, city, or incorporated town or board of 
0dncation; '~ * *. (Section 104-61-1, Utah Code 
1.943.) 
"'rhe Publie School System in cities of the 
first and seeond elass shall be controlled by the 
hoard of edueation of ~lwh <'ltlPs, separate and 
apart from trw eounties in which tlw <~ities are 
loeated, and all s<·hool proJwrty therein sllall be 
under the <liredion awl control of the City Board 
of I•:chwation." (Section 75-9-5 Utah Code 1.943.) 
''Cities and sehool districts may eon tract and 
cooperate with one another ill matten; affecting 
the h<'alth, Wl~lfare and convenienct) of the inhabi-
tants within tlwir respective 1Prritorial limits; 
and citil~S may disburse pnblie funds ill aid of 
the sehool dish·icts within the limits of their re-
spective ciii<~~." (Section 75-9-21 Utah Code 1.943, 
approved itfarcli 14, i949.) 
"Hoanl~ of Education of Utah school di,·)-
tricts may participate in the joint construetion 
or orwration, or both, of a school attl'ndPd b:y 
ehildren within the district and ehildren rl'siding 
in adjoining districts, fdther within or ont~ide the~ 
N tat<', prov id(•d, ( ll<• agT('ClllPll t lwt we<'ll the hoards 
of' edueation of all participating· districts, signed 
hy Ow residents (sie,) of the n~~rwetive hoards, 
is filed with tlw Rtat<> Board of l~uucation." (Sec-
timi 76-11-:Jf!' Utah eode 194.'1, apprm:erl Jlrfarch 
1.9, 1.949.) 
"En~ry hoanl ol' <·<hwation shall hav<' pow<'r 
and authority to pureha~e and ::-;ell ~choolhoni'<' 
sites and impro\"PilH'nt~ thereon, to construct and 
t'r<'<'L ~<·hool lmilding~ and to l"urni~h the sam<·. to 
<'~iahl i::-;lt, 1 oeate an<] maintain kind<'rga rtcn 
~dwol~, <·omnwn sehools consisting of prirnar/ 
and grammar grades, high ~chool~ aml indu~t rial 
or manual training school~, to <>~tabli~h and Sllll-
port ~ehool librariPs, to pureha~e, exchang<~, re-
pair and improvf~ high sdwol apparatus, hook:-;, 
fnrnitun•, fixtm·<·~ and all othcr school :mpplie:::. 
* * * and may adopt by-laws and rules for its 
<1\VIl proet•<hll'P and mak<' and <mforce all neodl'ul 
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rules and regulations for the control and man-
agement of the public schools of the district." 
(Section 75-11-20 Utah Code 1943.) 
"The board of education of every school dis-
trict shall be a body corporate under the namn 
of the 'Board of Education of-------------------- School 
Distrid or '------------------------ City' as the case may be 
(inserting the proper name), and shall have an 
official seal conformable to such name, which 
shall be used by its Clerk in the authentication 
of all matters requiring- it. Said boards in the 
11amC' aforesaid may sue ,and he sued, and may 
take, hold, lt>a::-;e, :,;~11 and convey real and per-
sonal property as th(~ interests of the schools may 
require." (Section 76-Y-8 Utah Code 1943.) 
"When all the territory of a school district 
shall become annexed to a city of the first or 
second class by the extension of the boundaries 
of the city, all the school property, including 
moneys on hand and due to such district, together 
~with all records and papers belonging to such 
district, shall be transferred to and title shall 
vest in the board of education of such city, and 
such board of education shall assume and be held 
responsible for the legitimate floating and bonded 
indebtedness of such annexed district." (Section 
'?!S-9-10 Utah Code 1943.} 
For apportionment of bonded indebtedness, 
when by the extension of the limits of any city 
of the first or second class into an adjacent 
school district, see Section 75-9-11. 
"Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is 
a use authorized by law; 
\'2.) that the taking is necc::;sary to such use; 
and, 
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(3) if alrl•ady appropriated tu 1-lullle public 
use, that the public use to which it is to be applied 
is a more necessary public use." (Section 104-
6'1-4 Utah Code 1943.} 
"In all cases where land is n~quired for pu!J-
Iic use, Uw person, or his agent, in charge of snch 
use may survey and locatP tlw same; lmi it nnL.;t 
he loeated in the manner which will he most eom-
patible with the f.!)"Patest pnhlie g-ood and Ute least 
privatn injur~-, and subjeet to the provisions ol' 
this ehapter. Tlw person, or hi:,; agent, in ehar~·e 
of ;;.;m~h publie u:,;e may enter upon the land and 
malw examinations, survl~ys and maps th<>n•oi', 
and such l~ntry shall constitut<\ no eausc of ae-
tion in favor of tlw owners of the lands, except 
l'or injuries resulting from negligenee, wanton-
IIPSS or malieP." (Sedion 104-6'1-5 Utah Code 
l.'M.'J.) 
"Tlw plaintiff" mn:· moYP thP eourt or a judgl~ 
lh<•n•ol', at any tim<~ aftpr the eornm<·n<·emeat ol" 
suit, on notiee to the d<:d\mdant, it' he is a n>sident 
of the state, or has appeared by attornPy in thE\ 
aetion, othPrwis<\ hy :·wrving a notice din\cted to 
him on the clerk of the eourt, for an order per--
mitting the plaintiff to occup~c the prPmis<•-.: 
sought to be CondC-'IllilPd flPII<ling tfw a<~tioll, and 
in do sneh work thl'reon as may he required for 
the easement sought according to its nature. rl'h0 
eonrt or a judge thereof shall take proof by affi-
davit or otherwi:,;e of the value of the premises 
sought to be condernn<~d and of the damages whieh 
will acerue from the condemnation, and of tlJt> 
n~asons for requiring a speedy occupation, and 
shall grant or refuse the motion according to the 
r>quity of the ca!'le and the relativ<.~ damages which 
may accrue to the parties. If the motion is 
gran ted, the court o I' judgy shall n•quirc th1• 
Jllaintiff to execute and file in court a bond to 
the defen(lant with sureties to be approved by 
the court or judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by 
the court or judge, not less than double the valu(~ 
of the pre.mises sought to be condemned and the 
damage:,; whieh will ensue from con(lemnation, as 
the same may appear to the co'lut or judge on 
the hearing, and eonditioned to pay the adjudged 
valu<~ of the premises and all damages in case 
t hP THO pert~- is eondonuwd, and to pay all dam-
ages arising from occupation before judgment in 
case the premises are not condemned, and all 
costs adjudged to the defendant in the action. 
The sureties shall justify before the court or 
jndge after a reasonable notice to the defendant 
of the time and place of justification. The amounts 
fi.xed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, 
and shall not be admissable in evidence on final 
hearing. The court or judge may also, pending 
the action, restrain the defondant from hinder-
ing or interfering with the occupation of the 
premises and the doing thereon of the work re-
(£Uired for the easement." (Section 104-61-_10 
Utah Carie 1.943.) 
S'f' A'I'~J\lEN'P OF ARGUMEN'f'S 
I. 
THE SCHOOL BOARD IS A PUBLIC MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION OP 
THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE LEGISLATURE, POS-
SESSING ONLY SUCH POWERS AS ARE EXPRESSLY 
CONFERRED UPON IT AND SUCH IMPLIED POWERS 
AS ARE NECESSARY TO EXECUTE AND CARRY INTO 
EFFECT ITS EXPRESS POWERS. 
The legal status of the Board of JiJdueation of Salt 
Lake City ha:,; been fully acljuclicated by thE~ State 
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Supreme Court. Quotations from the Court's decisions 
are all that is necessary to elucidate the legal statu:-; 
of the School Board. 
1. ''' '' * '' 'rhe Board of J£ducation is in-
vested with thf) exclusive control of and respon-
sibility for the public school system, independent 
of the county government." * * '~ (Board of Edu-
cation of Salt Lake City v. Bergan, et al, 62 Dtah 
162, 217 Pac. 1112.) 
2. ''A board of education is a legal entity 
created by statute. For the purpose of adminis-
tering the affairs n~lating to Rchools within a 
designated area, certain limited powers are con-
ferred upon boards of education. 'l'hese powers 
are exercised for the welfare and in the intereo'lt 
of the people within the designated area. In Utah 
there an) three types or classPs of school districts. 
'1\vo of tlw classt•s are ereated by the Constitu-
tion insol"ar as tlw tPrritoria1 area is <lm;ignated, 
eomprising eiiies of the firtlt and of the second 
elass. Constitution of the State or Utah, Article 
X, Sedion fi. 'rhe third type of elass has been 
denominated 'county sdwol <listricts of the first 
elass', Laws o!' l 1tal1 1 ~JOG, Chapter 107, some-
times refened to as '<~<msoli<lated school dis-
b·iets' and now referred to as '<~<mnty school dis-
tricts'." (Hansen v. Board of Rdttcation, _____ _ 
·Utah ______ , llG Pac. 2d 9:)G.) 
i3. '"rhe powers of the hoard of edneation ar0 
statutory, since the h)gislatnre may authorize the 
governing authoriti<)S of :owhool distriets, as the 
state's agents, to do anything not prohibited by 
the Constitution '~ * '. 'l'he board of education, 
being a ereation of the legislature, has only such 
powers as are expressly <~onferred upon it and 
sueh impli.P<l pow(~J·s as an~ neePssary to execute 
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and earry into dfect its express powers." (Beard 
1'. Hoard of Education, Rl Utah Gl, 16 Pac. 2d 
~)00-903.) 
4. '' ' * ''' A board of edueation 1s a public 
municipal ('Orporation." (Chamberlain v. Wat-
ter.-.,., 10 Utah 298, ;n Pae. 5GG.) 
5. Cf: (Carbon County v. Oarhon County 
Hi,qh School !Jistrict, 4fi Utah 147, 143 Pac. 220.) 
JI. 
THE SCHOOL BOARD IS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN ONLY WITHIN 
THE MUNICIPAL LIMITS OF SALT LAKE CITY. 
'rhe pmn~r of eminc~nt domain has its inception ht 
tlw so\·en~ignity of the state. It is a power inherent in 
the statP and essential to ih; existenc·e. It i:,.; based on 
the law of 1weessity. It is not dependent for its existem··~ 
upon a specific grant in the Constitution of the state. 
The provision in the Utah State Constitution relating 
to the taking of property for the public use (Article 1, 
SPetion 22) does not by implication grant the power of 
eminent domain to the government of the state, but 
limits a power which would otherwise be limitless. 
( 18 A rn. Jur., Sent ion 7, lJ. (j.'J!J.) 'rhe right to authorizt~ 
the exerc~ise of this po\\'er helongs exclusively to tlw 
legislatun~. 'L'he legislature call:-: the power into opera-
tion l'rom tltP depths of' the state'::; sovereignty. No 
rnunii'ipal e.orporation or other sllhdivision of the stat•~ 
lws an)r right to <~xereise thP power ol' eminPnt domain 
\\'itltont sp<•eifi<~ authority front th<~ legislatUJ'('. 1t nm-;t 
follow that tlw IPgislature ea11 <~onhol and limit the 
<'X!'n·is<' ol' tl1is p<mer vvhen <l<>legat<>d hy it. (18 Am. 
Jf) 
Jur., Sec. D, p. 637.) Statutes granting the power of 
eminent domain to agencies or units of the state are in 
contravention of the common rights of persons, and 
should receive a strict construction. (Lewis on Eminent 
Domain, 3rd Edition, Vol. 1, p. 708, Sec. 388; ()ooley on 
Constitutional Limitation::;, 8th Edition, Vol. :J, p. 1112.) 
'l'he power of eminent domain, when delegah•d by the 
state to a political unit or agency, will be strictly con-
strued against the agency or unit receiving the grant 
of power. (Peavey-Wilson Lumber Company v. Brevard 
()ounty, 31 So. (Fla.) 2d 483; 172 A.L.R. 168; Wise v. 
Y a.zoo City, 90 Miss. 507, 51 So. 453, 26 L.R.A. ( NS) 1130.) 
Beyonu doubt the School Board has received from 
the legislature of the State of Utah a grant of the power 
of eminent domain for the purpose of securing lands 
necessary for the construction and maintenance of school 
buildings and grounds. 'l'he statute granting this power 
makes no specific provision for the exercise of same by 
the School Board upon lands without and beyond the 
limits of the School Board's jurisdiction. It is there-
fore the contention of the petitioners that the School 
Board cannot exercise this power of eminent domain 
upon land located without the municipal limits of said 
city. Tho School Board, in seeking to obtain 6.07 acres 
of land admittedly without the limits of Salt Lake City 
and within the limits of Granite School District, is act-
mg without either specific or implied authority. 
The petitioners submit the following quotations 
from recognized authorities to sustain tltt>ir position: 
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1. '' 'l1he primary purpose of a municipal cor-
poratiou is to eontribute to\vard the ~welfare, 
health, happiness and public interest of the in-
habitants of such corporation, and not to further 
the interests of those residing outside its limits; 
therefore, the general rule is that municipal cor-
porations have no extra-territorial powers, but 
their ;jurisdiction ends at the municipal bounda•·-
ies, and cannot, without specific legislative author-
ity, extenu beyonu their geographical limits. * * ~, 
As a governmental unit, the municipal corpora-
tion is the agent of the state, exercising its powers 
t'or and in hehalf of the state. x ,,, * when a povver 
granted to a municipal corporation cannot be 
exercised without going outside the corporate 
limits, the requisite authority to do so will be im-
plied." (37 Am. Jur. p. 736, Sec. 122.) 
2. "'l'he power of the legislature to authorize 
a municipal corporation to acquire lands beyond 
the municipal limits, and for that purpose to 
exercise the power of eminent domain, cannot be 
disputed. It has long been recognized to exist 
where the use for which the property is taken is 
a proper and reasonable public use.'' ( 3 Dillon, 
Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition, 1626, Sec. 
1028.} 
3. '' '~ * ,x, Likewise, a municipality cannot 
condemn lands within the State but outside its 
own corporate limits, unless the power has been 
delegated by the legislature. However, it is well 
settled that the legislature may delegate such 
power." ( 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 
2nd Edition, 406, Sec. 1619.} 
4. ''As a general rule, a municipal corpora-
tion's powers cease at municipal boundaries, and 
cannot, without plain manifestation of legis1ative 
intention, be exercised beyond its limits, even 
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tlwugJJ it uwy lmYe ae<1nin•d prop<'riy outside its 
geographieal limits. x ·x· ~· Statuh•s authoriz;ing 
the exereise o[ municipal power b(~yon<l the ma-
nicipal boundarie::; are strictly construed.'' ( 43 
C. J., Sec. 2.'1.3, pzJ. 235-236.) 
5. ''As a general rule, a llllmiei pal corpora-
tion has no power to pnreha:·w and hold land for 
a park, highway, or other municipal purpose, be-
yoiHl its territorial limits, unless the power has 
been specially eonf<•rrpd upo11 it by the legislatun, 
and s~tch power is not confcrn;rl by a general g1·ant 
of pou:er to purchase, hold and convey such prozl-
erty, real and personal, as may be necessary fot' 
its public uses and p1trposes." (Italics supplied) 
( 43 C. J., Sec. 2082, p .. 1327.) 
6. '"rhe authority to condemn must be ex-
pressly given or necessarily implied. The exercise 
of the po·wer being against common right, it can-
not be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful 
language, but must be given in expn~ss terms or 
by neeessary implication. \Vhen the right tu 
exercise the power can only be made out by argu-
ment and inference, it does not exist. ''J'ht~re must 
be no effort to prove the existence of sueh high 
corporate right, else it i::; in doubt; and if so, the 
State ha::; not grante<1 it.' If the Aet is silent on 
the snb;ject, and the powers given by it can lk 
exercised without resort to condPrrmation, it JS 
presumed that the legislature intended that the 
necessary property be ac<1uired hy eoHtracL * ~-· * 
_,f..,. a nile, a 11/ltnir:ipal corporation cannot con-
di'Jitn property beyond ils limits, Hnless (Wthoril,tJ 
lo do so is exzn·essly givew. ( r taJim; s u pplie<l) 
(Lewis on Erninent Dmnain, .'lrri Rdition, Sec. 
871). 
7. "A municipal corporation <'an not exercise 
its powPrs onlside its limits, <'Xe<'lll wlH•n grantPd 
IS 
t'-"PI"l\tli:\ l<'gislative authority to do so, for all 
powers and privileges conferred by the Constitu-
tion and ::;tatute::; on municipal corporations mud 
he held to be limited in their exercise to the tern-
tory emhraee<l within the municipal boundaries 
and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the mu-
nieipality, unless Uw Con::;titution or statutes ex-
pressly providn that such power and privilegu · 
may JJe <'Xereised beyond tJw corporate boundar-
ies and for the benefit of non-residents." (Sweet-
water v .Hamer, 259 S. \V. ('!'ex. Civil Appeal) 
191.) 
8. "'~ '"' 'x' 'l'he city has and can have jurisdic-
tion only within its own limits. While it is true 
that poliee powers may sometimes be given for 
a limited spaee around the eity limits for speeial 
purposes, Yf\t they must Le specially given; and 
with that exeeption, the principle is universal 
illat tlw city lms no jurisdidion lJpyond its limit..;. 
A ltearnod writer has said that one of the distin-
guishing fc~atnres of differences between the civil 
law of Romp and the common law of England is 
that tll<' civil law aeted personally while the com-
Ilion law adH territorially. 'I'he civil law applied 
io evNy !~oman citi;-;en, \Yherever he was, and only 
a Ho!llan eiti;-;en could claim the benefit of it, even 
in Rowe; while tlH~ eommon law operates on every 
pn~on and thing· in thP tPrritory, and on thoHe 
only. '!'he Stat<~ ean levy on a man's property 
found within the State, but there is no way hy 
whi<'h it <·an ti" a pn~onal liahility on !Jim ou(::;i<l<· 
tlw State." (Jones v. Hines, ______ Alahmua 
47 So. 7~)9, 22 L.R.A. (NS) 1098.) 
9. "The general ru](• is that a muni<'ipal cor-
poration has no power to purehase aml hold land 
l"or a park or other mnni<~ipal pnrposE~s beyond 
its eorporatc~ limits, nnl<'ss the pom~r has h<~<'JJ 
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s rwe:ally eon J'cnect by the legisla tun~." (City 
of Wichita v. Clapp, et al, 263 Pac. (Kansas) 12.) 
10. "lt is equally m~ll settled law that a mu-
nicipal corporation is, as a g-eneral rule, restricted 
to its eorporatt~ limits in the exercise of its cor-
pcn·ate powers." (Swit.zcr v. Harrisonbttrg, 52 
S. K (Ya.) 174, 2 L. R A. (NS) 910.) 
11. "All powers and privileges co11ferreu by 
the Constitution and statutes on municipal cor-
porations must be held to be limited in their 
PXercise to the territory embraced in the muni-
eipal boundaries and for the benefit of the in-
habitants o,f the municipality, unless the Consti-
tution or statute expressly provides that snell 
powe'fs and privileges may be exerciseu beyond 
thP corporate bounuaries or for the benefit of 
non-residents.'' (Childs v. City of Columbia, 70 
S.K (So. Car.) 296, 34 L.R.A. (NS) 542.) ' 
12. wrhe general uoctrine is clear that such 
[municipal] corporations cannot usually exer-
cise their powers beyonu their own limits. The 
right to exercise extra-territorial powers can only 
arise by express grant of authority '~ * * or by 
necessary implication from other powers grant-
ed." '' '' '' (Hecker v. City of LaCrosse, 40 L.R.A. 
(Wis.) 829.) 
13. "It is a general principle that a municipal 
corporation cannot usually exercise its powers be-
yond its own limits, and if in any case it has 
authority to do so it must be derived from some 
statute which expressly or impliedly permits it 
* * *. 'l'he uoctrine of ultra vires is applied with 
greater strictness to municipal bodies than to 
private corporations." (Fonrell v. Seattle, 86 
Pac. CWash.) 217.) 
14. "A municipal corporation empowerc•d 'L> 
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purchase, lwlJ anJ convey any estate, real or per-
sonal, for the public use of said corporation' can-
not take a conveyance of land beyond its bound-
aries for a puhlie highway." (Riley v. Rochester, 
9 N.Y. G4.) 
15. "*' * '' Unless expressly empowered by 
statute, the 'J'own of Craig has no anthority tu 
eondemn land outsiu(~ its corporate limits for 
sewer purposes. 'J'he bare right of the 'l'own t\J 
eont>truct and maintain sewen.; cannot be held ta 
include tl1c right to condemn property beyond it,.; 
corporate limits, in eonnPdion therewith. '" ''' " 
the giving of the right to construct :-;ewers does 
not also grant authoritr to subject out::-;ide lands 
to operation of mnirH'nt domain. Sueh power is 
not implied, lwcamw ther<:> is nothing in our stat-
utes to even indicate, mtwh le:,;s illlply sneh pnr-
pose." (Macl.: o. Ton·n of Craiq, G8 Colo. 3:-l7, 191 
Pac. 101.) 
'l'here can he no <l<>nial of nw ::-;tatenwnt that tlw 
statutes relating hoth to th(~ PXPf'cisP of the power of 
t>minent domain aml to Uw authority and powen.; of tlll' 
Srhool Board do not speeifically and PxprPssly authori,,e 
the S(•hool Board to exerciHe tlw power of PminPnt domain 
without and hPyond the mnni<'ipal limit8 of Salt Lalw 
City. Under tlw authoritie8 abO\'P cited, thP pmwr in 
eondPnm property beyond the botmdari<~8 of tlw mnniei 
pal eorporation, exereising the right or eminPnt domain, 
mnHt be PXprt)ssly givPn, and :'lll('h pow<>r is not conf<"rrPd 
hy a grant of power to ]mrclmse, hold and eom'<'Y n'at 
propPrt.v, or h~· tlw grant of the right ot' PmiMnt domain. 
Tlw l1tah statutes quoted in full aho\'e an~ Htartlingly 
silent with rPspect to the exereisP of thP powers of the 
Sehool Hoard bPyond tlw honndaric•:,; of Nall LakP Cit:,. 
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Rather, these statutes, when read and considered either 
separately or as a whole, compel the conclusion that the 
legislatmc had no intention of granting general extra-
territorial powen; to the Sehool Board. There are, how-
ever, hvo statutes enacted in 1949 that directly imply 
that school hoards in Utah cannot exercise extraterri-
torial powers without specific authorization from the 
legislature. 
'1_1he first of these statutes is Section 75-11-26 Utah 
Code 1943, approved March 19, 1949, which authorizes 
boards of education of Utah to participate in the joint 
construction or operation, or both, of a school attended 
by children within tlw district and children residing in 
adjoining districts, either within or outside of the State. 
Undoubtedly this statute had its origin in the necessities 
arising in connection with the operation of schools 
located near State boundary lines. It is suggested that 
the situation at ·wendover, Utah, or i"n the extreme 
southwestern corner of the State in Washington County, 
called for this legislative action. :B--,urthenuore, it is easy 
to imagine schools being located on or near the boundary 
lines between school distriets in isolated and thinly 
populated areas whieh would be affected by this statute. 
It will he noted that here is a grant of extraterritorial 
power, and undoubtedly the statute was enacted because 
of the limitation on the powers of school boards which 
prohibited them from constructing or operating schools 
outside of their respective districts. 
The second of these statutes is Sechon 75-9-21 Utah 
Code 1943, approved March 14, 1949, whieh (1) enables 
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cities and :-;dwol di~triets io contract and cooperate with 
one another in matters affecting the health, welfare and 
<·onvenienee of the inhabitants within their respectivP 
territorial limits, and (2) authorizes cities to disburse 
puhli(' funds in aid of the ::;chool districts within the limits 
of the respedive cities. This statute, for example, 
authorizes Salt Lake City Corporation ancl a school 
distrid adjacent to the boundaries of the city, to co-
operate with one another in matters affecting health, 
welfare and convenience of the inhabitants within their 
respective territorial limits. This is a grant of extra-
territorial power, both to Salt Lake City Corporation 
and to the adjacent school district, with a direct inferenc·~ 
that without this grant of power no such power wou];l 
exist. 'l'he second authoriZJation of this statute enable~-; 
cities to disburse their public funds in aid of school 
<listricts within the limits of the re:-;peetive cities. Here 
again is a specill(' grant of power, not of an extra-
territorial nature, hnt a grant of authority to nse city 
l"tmds for school purpos<~s. It is therefore a grant of 
spP<'ial authority of an <•xtraonlinary natun~, and <·an 
WPJl lw Jikem~d to a grant OJ' extraterritorial power. 
'L'he paHPni sPt h.Y ]pg·islation goYerning- hoards ol' 
edueation is well <kmonstrated h~' referenep to f4Pdio:t 
70-9-10 Utah Code 194:1, quoted in full ahon. '!'his 
statute provides that when all the tenitory of a school 
di::;trict shall lweorw~ annexed to a <~ity of thP fir::;t Ol' 
second class by the e:x:lensiun of the bmmdaries of the 
ciltJ, all tliP :-whool property, in<'lndinll,' money:; on hand 
and <ltH• to ~neh dist ri<·l, lrlg't•tlwr \\'ith all reeonls and 
papers lwlonging io such distriet, shall be transferred 
to and title shall vest in the hoard of ~~dncation of suci1 
city, and such board of education shall assume and b<.~ 
held rPsponsihle for the legitimate floating and bonded 
indebtedness of such annexed district. Section 75-9-11 
prescribes the method of apportioning the bonded indebt-
edness of such annexed district. rrhese two sections 
specifically recogni11e the territorial limits of the juri,,-
diction of a hoard of education of a city of the fir.-::t 
class, and in effect extends the jurisdiction of such 
board of education over the newly annexed area of tht~ 
city. It is deelaratory of the principle that the juri~;­
diction of the School Board is co-extensive only with 
the municipal boundary lines of Salt Lake City. It is 
submitted that this statute alone argues loudly in behalf 
of petitioners' claim that the School Board, neither by 
direct grant or implication, possesses any extraterritorial 
powers, except m the specific instances above recited, 
and the power of eminent domain is not within these 
exceptions. 
It is true that the facts of this situation are nniqm~. 
The Sehool Board map corrPetly shows that there is 
an area of Salt Lake County which is in effect an 
"island" within the municipal limits of Salt Lake City. 
It is within this county "island" that over half of 
petitioners' land is situate. A great many reasons may 
be suggested for the existence of this county ''island'' 
within the municipal boundaries of Salt Lake City, hnt 
for the purposes of this case such reasons are wholly 
immaterial. The fact is clear that this "island" is 
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county tenitory, and not an area over which Salt Lake 
City exercises jurisdiction. Pe'titioners submit that this 
unique situation does not in any degree change or 
mitigate the rule with respect to the exercise of extra-
territorial powers by the School Board. The condemna-
tion action seeks to take land which is within the juris-
diction of both Salt Lake County and the Granite School 
District, and not within the jurisdiction of the School 
Board. 
\Vhen the statutes governing boards of education of 
the State of Utah are eorrelated and analyzed, one 
seeks in vain for a conclusion that there is any grant of 
extraterritorial pmver to the School Board, except in 
the case of the two 1949 statutes. These two statutes 
are a departure from the gene1:al pattern set by thr~ 
fundamental legislation g?verning school districts, and 
appear to strongly support petitioners' contention that 
the School Board, in the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain, possesses no extraterritorial authority. If the 
School Board must be specifically authorized to partici-
pate in a joint construction or operation with another 
school district of the State or with a school district of 
an adjoining state, it follows that it must be specifically 
authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain 
upon land located without the jurisdiction of the School 
Board. 
III. 
PETITIONERS HAVE BEEN AND WILL BE SUB-
JECTED TO IRREMEDIAL AND IRRETRIEVABLE 
CONSEQUENCES AND INJUSTICE WHICH WILL DE-
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STROY THE STATUS QUO AND RENDER AN APPEAL 
FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE CONDEMNA-
TION ACTION INEFFECTUAL TO UNDO THE MIS-
CHIEF VISITED UPON PETITIONERS, IN THE EVENT 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD, UPON DIRECT AP-
PEAL FROM SAID FINAL JUDGMENT, DETERMINE 
THAT THE SCHOOL BOARD DOES NOT POSSESS THE 
POWER AND AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN UPON LAND SITUATE WITH-
OUT THE MUNICIPAL LIMITS OF SALT LAKE CITY. 
1. The petitioners <lemurn~d both g-Pnerall;, ami 
speelally to the School Boanl's complaint ln thP <'on-
demnation action, and also move>d the Court for nn 
order requiring the School Board to make its eomplaint 
more definite and eertain. By thes<' demurrers and 
motion, the petitioners raised directly hefon~ the Distri<·t 
Court the fluestion as to the power and authority of tlw 
Sehool Board to condemn land loeated ~without and hv-
yond the boundaries of Salt Lake City. The Distriet 
Court overruled the demurrers and denied the motion. 
Further, the District Court simultaneously granted the 
Sehool Board's motion for an order to enter the land 
sought to be condemned for the purpose of making 
examinations, surveys and maps. It was at this stage 
of the condemnation action that petitioners applied to 
the Supreme Court for the alternative writ of Prohibi-
tion against the District Court and the School Board. 
Consideration must be given to the situation that then 
confronted the petitioners: 
(a) The order of the District Court made, entered 
and filed on October 10, 1949, in the 'action of Board of 
Edneation of Salt Lake City v. B(~rtagnoli, 0t al, Ca"'' 
~ o. 87,004, granting the said Board of ~ducation author-
it~, to Pnter upon tlw premises sought to be condemned 
for tl1P purpo~es of making examinations, surveys and 
maps, is hut an intPrloeutory order, aml non-appealable. 
(A t1 oniC?J General v. Pomeroy, 93 Ft. 426, 73 Pac. 2d 
1277, 1289; Utah CopJJer Company v . .Montana-Bingharn 
Oon:·;o/idated .Minin,rJ Co., G9 Utah 428, 255 Pac. 672-676.) 
(h) In the f~Yent the District Court in the action of 
Board of l'~ducation of Salt Lake City v. Bertagnoli, et al, 
Casp No. 87,004, rnakPs and enter.s an order granting 
said Hoard of 11Jdu<'ation authority to occupy the premises 
sought to he condmnned pending said action, and to do 
~mch work thereon as may he required, pursuant to 
Seetion 104-61-10 Utah Code, 1943, such order will be 
hut an interloeutor)T order, and not appealable. ( AttornP,if 
General v. Pomeroy, supra; Utah C' op pi! r Co. v . .Montana-
Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., s'upra.) 
(e) rl'he order of tlw Distrid Court dat<~d October 
10, 1949, overruling petitioners' !!,'<~neral demurrer to th·~ 
<'omplaint of the Boanl of J<~dw~ation in tJw aetiou ni' 
t h<· Board of 11:du<"ation of Salt Lake Cit~· v. BE~rtagnoli, 
1'1 al, C:u..;l! ;\ll. ~~7.004, is nm1-appealahk (Attorney 
Oencml1'. PoJJI!'l'O,IJ, supra; Otah CoJJ])I'r ('o. 1' . • ~1onta.na­
Hinqliam Consolidat('d Mining Oo., supm; Smith v. Mc-
RrntJ, 8 Utah ;)8, 2!) Pa1·. 10:30.) 
Petitioners' dPIIIntTPrs to trw complaint of the School 
Board in the condemnation adion, and their motion to 
reqmre the Rehool Board to makP its eomplaint mon~ 
<ldinit<' anil ('<'dain, with their n•sistanee to the Sehool 
Board's motion for an or-der permitting it to Pllkt· 
the premise>s to make <~xaminations, snrvPys and map:-:, 
afforded the Distriet Court an opportunity to ru]p upon 
the questions rPgarding the Distr·iet Court's jnris(lietioa 
on~r the aetion and whd}wr thP ~ehool Hoard possesse1l 
th<' power to condemn land situate without the nmnieipnl 
limits of Halt Lake Cit~'· 'rhe petitionprs, exhansh'd 
ill(';l' immediatP ]pgal rt>m<,(liPs iu the Distriet Court. 
"lt is fundamental that the court or tribunal 
sought to he prohibitPd must he giyen a proper 
npportnnity to rule upon ohjeetions to its pro-
ceedings before the writ of prohibition will lit>. 
'l'hi:::; is so evPn where the court or tribunal ha,-; 
no jurisdiction." (Olson v, District Court, lOG 
lTtah 220, 147 Pae. :2d 471; Fur /Jrccders' Apricul-
tnral Coop v. Wiesley, 102 Utah 601, 132 Pac. 2d 
384; State ex rel Welling v. District Court, 87 
Utah 416, 49 Pac. 2d 950; Van Cott v. Turner, 88 
Utah fi35, 56 Pac. 2d 16.) 
'J'lwrefore the petitiom~rs fulfilled the fir:::;t requirement 
for tlw issuancP of tlw alternative vnit of Prohibition. 
2. The petitiOiwrs were further f,aced with the threat 
expressed hy eounsd for Hw School Board in open 
eourt, that on or ahont .January 1 ,1950 the Sehoul 
Hoard intended to apply to the Court for an order of 
oeenpmwy of' the pn•mises by the School Board under 
tlw authol'it)' of SPdion 1 04-Gl-10 Utah Codp 194:L 
'l'he uccupaney ot' tlw premises thus to he sought would 
be for ilte purposL~ of eonstrueting tlw sehool building 
thereon, and undoubtedly work would lw eommeneed on 
the structure dming tlw pendpncy of the condemnation 
action in the District Court. Such sitnation would inftiet 
npon the petitionPrs Huch irretrievable l'oss 1and damage 
that a n~vcrsal of the final judgment of the District 
Court in said condemnation by the Supreme Court 
\\·onld not restore petitioners to their statns quo. If 
tlte School Board does not po~>sess the legal authority 
to eorHlPnm tlw part of petitioners' land located exterior 
to Hw boundaries of Ralt Lake City, the petitioners an~ 
undPr no <·ompnlsion to snrrender possession of the · 
s·aid part and parcel of their land to the School Board 
under Section 104-Gl-10 Utah Code 1943. They are en-
titled to the possession of their land, and they are en-
titled to their land as va<~ant land. The fact that the 
School Board may placr~ a struetun~ thereon which would 
be a loss to tht> Ndwol Board, should it finally b<~ lwld 
that it had no auilwrit.v to ae<tnin~ ih<~ land, wonld not 
lw plaeiug the pditioners in I hP position Uwy O<~<·npied 
prior to tlw institution of tlw eon<hmmation aetion. rrheir 
fun<lanH·ntal right of PxeluHive possPssion ol' tlwir !awl 
in its tlt<'ll eondiiion would ltavP lwen violated, and n•sii-
i uti on to th<•nt in form of damages, or evt>n by the aequi-
sitiolt ol' H partially OJ' wholly <'Olllplete<l sd100l strudure 
on ihP laud would uot h~ave ih<·nl in the ~>am(~ positio~1 
they 1voulu haVl~ oeeupied had possession of their land 
110t bl'Pll \\T<'sf<•d from tlwm. rl'h<•y W<'l'<' ('Ollfl'OIItl~d with 
a partieularly <·ritieal ~ituation aft<~r tlw a<lvnrsn rtdingl'\ 
of' the Distrid Court, mHl tlH·y w<·n~ not eompPllP<l to 
await thP out<'Oill(~ of' Uw ('01Hlenmation adion hdoru 
t<~sting tlw authority of' the Nehool I3oanl in the SnprPIIH' 
( \mrt. rf'}w irretriuvabln damag<~ which \\'Ollld 1)(• Hl-
fli<'f<•d upon tiH~m h,\· Uwir loss ol' possnssion of' th<' 
land and use then•of hy the 8ehool Board presc·n ied a 
faetnal situation whid1 auihoril'.erl th<>m inlm<>diatPly t') 
appl)' to the Supr<>me Court for an aH<~mative writ of 
Prohihi tion, to the und that the SC'hool Boanl 's authority 
could be determine(] forthwith. '!'liP relief whieh :l 
rPp;ular app<>al from the eond<~nmation judgment wonld 
afford wonl<l he wholly inad<>qnai<~, nndPr the eireum-
stances. 
J lad the pditimwrs r<>mained passivr~ al'ter thP 
rulings of the Distriet Court, and allowPd the 8chool 
Board to enter upon the premise::; and con::;truct valnahll' 
improvements thereon, thPy would prohahl)' have bePn 
;mhjeded to the charge of acquieseing in thC' action of 
the School Board. By their allowing the 8rhool Board 
to proeeed with eonstruetio11 of a building and the 
expenditure of a large ::;um of money thereon, they migh~ 
also lw e>stopped from asse>rting that the School Board 
had no authority to rondPmn land without the municip'll 
houndarie>s of Salt Lah City. In view of these perils, 
it was ineumhent upon the petitimwrs to take immediate 
lPgal aetion not only to protPet tlwir own right, but 
also to forewarn the School Board that petitioner!'l 
were contesting its authority to eomh•rnn the part of 
their land located outside of the munic•ipal bonndarie" 
of Salt Lake City. 
rl'lw .authoritie>s her0inafter cited sustain the issuanc2 
of tlw \Vrit under the>s<' eonditions: 
"What can be said is that ordinarily the su-
perior court \vill look only to sn<> if the lower 
emut was nding without or i11 PX<'<'ss of ;jnrisdic• 
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tion, and ir so, whether there is still not some 
adequate and spPedy remedy, but that in certain 
situations when) it would work a palpable injus-
tice or hardship or cause damage which could 
not he checked or remedied in any other way, the 
superior court will not go too refinedly into the 
question as to what constitutes error merely, or 
lade or excess of jurisdiction, before issuing the 
\\'rit." (Atwoor/1•. Oo:x:, 88 Utah 42fi, :55, Pac. 2d 
:r/7 at :ms.) 
.1\'oTI!t Point Consolidated In. Co. v. Utah 
and Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 
4G Pac. 824. 
Olson u. The District CotlTt, supra. 
Hrnadbent v. Gibson, 105 TJtr.h 5:1, J40 Pac. 
:Zd 939. 
Me,IJCrs u. 11ronson .• 100 Utah 279, 114 Pac. 2d 
21iL 
A dolph Coors Co. v. Liq1wr Control Commis-
·'·ion, 99 Utah 246, 105 Pae. 2d 181. 
Allen v. Di:nbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 Pac. 2d 220. 
People u. Sj;ie1's, 4 Utah 3R5, 10 Pac. 601, Jl 
Pac. 509. 
Cf. Home Owners' Loan Co1poration v. Lo-
r;an Cit.11, 97 Utah 235, 92 Pac. 2d 346. 
rrherefore tht) second condition for the issuance of the 
"rrit of Prohibition is Jnt)t in this case. 
IV. 
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER A BOARD OF EDU-
CATION POSSESSES POWER TO ACQUIRE LAND 
SITUATE WITHOUT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE DIS-
TRICT BY EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN PRESENTS AN ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORT-
ANCE TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
:n 
AND ON THIS BASIS A WRIT OF PROHIBITION 
SHOULD ISSUE. 
InvohTed in thi8 action is a question of broad puhlin 
concPrn, and that is \Ylwther or not the hoards of educa-
tion of this state ean, through tlw use of the power of 
rminPnt domain, go without their respective district;-; 
and aequin' land. As indicated in this brief, the pattern 
ot' lt>gi:-dation of this state has been to confine the juris-
diction and powers of the hoards of education to their 
respective districh;. A decision that would uphold the 
School Board in the instant case would represent a 
deviation from thiH pattern, which might have far-
reaching effect, particularly within the populated areas 
of the state. lt can vn~ll hf~ imagined that a segmem 
of the population living within the municipal boundaries 
of Salt Lake City might he more conveniently sPrved 
if the School Board lueated one of its new buildings 
without the city limit~ and wthiu the limits of Granite 
School District. [l' eo!l(litions exist that reqnire the 
School Board to build structures and operate schooL; 
without the municipal limits ol· Salt Lakr City, it is 
res:peetfnlly suggested that legislative relief should bt~ 
sought rather than attempting to acquire property 
agaim;t the wishes of its owners by means of the judi-
cial process, when the authority for such action is oper1 
to most serious question. 'rhe public interest in this 
ease is direct. It is notorious that in certain areas of 
Salt Lake City there is a pressing demand for moru 
school buildings. If the petitioners are wrong in their 
contentions herein made, they should be so informed 
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imme<liately, so that the School Board can proceed 
forthwith in the construction of the necessary school 
lmilding. On the other hand, if petitioners are correct 
in their n~sistance to the School Board's action, they 
are entitled to an immediate protection of the courts. 
']'his situation i.-; well within the spirit and intention 
of tlw SuprPnw Court when it wrote: 
'"Perhaps the court i~ not entirely without 
.-;ome di:,;eretion in determining whether or not 
another adequate remedy exists. 'Discretion' 
does not mean happy or fortuitous choice, but a 
diseretion guided by cireurnstances surrounding 
the litigation. If the term 'adequate remedy' 
were an absolute, it might be ineorrect to say that 
we could ever grant the writ where there was an-
other adequate rPmedy. But 'adequate remedy' 
is a matter of degree and may nm the gamut of 
situations at one end where not to grant the writ 
would leave the petitioner where he could not 
retrieve hhnself. (Atwood v. Cox) to situations 
on the other hand vvhere not to grant the writ 
would leave the pf'titioner where there were no 
factors of hardship other than those which attend 
the ordinary judgment and appeal. In between, 
situation:,; may arise where, in the single case at 
bar, tht-re appears to be a remedy adequate in 
the ordinary course of the law, but where there 
are urgent public questions or questions of public 
policy involved directly or indirectly related or 
dependent upon the outcome, or where the urgent 
rights of a large group of the puhlie await tlw 
resolution of the question, or where a multiplicity 
of suits threaten, or where some facton;, either 
intrinsie or <'xtrinsic to the litigation, reveal thP 
ordinary course of the law really not to be ad\)-
quatP although on the face of things it may 
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tP('hnieally appuar to hc>. ln those ('a:,.;(•s Ult' \\'rit 
may issue in the sound diserdion of th(• court. 
l\~rhaps another wa~· of ~'.tating the propositimt 
would be to say that suC'h eirenmstanees inn>lvo 
a eontradiction and adually dd<:~at tho adequacy 
of tho remedy at law-render it not :;;o. In the last 
analysis, adequacy of legal remudy may he unde'c· 
eertain circumstanct~s a matter for reasonable 
tlifferew·es of opinion. Tn sueh cases if judgment 
prevailed for is:;;uing the writ over judgment 
against issuing it, it could he said to have issued 
in the sound discretion of the court, eveu though 
other minds might have reasonably coneluded that 
the legal remedy was adequate. Bnt 'sound dis-
cretion' must always he labell~~d with the precau-
tionary admonition that the writ is for extraord!-
nary occasions and should he sparingly used.'' 
(Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, at p. 942 of 140 
Pac. 2d.) 
Cl'. ~Vashinglo11 (.'o1mf1J 1'. Stale Ta:x: Com,. 
missiou, 10:J l Ttal1 7:l, l:l:l Pae. 2d 5fi4. 
WJH~I~EF0l{l1~, pditimwn; respedfull:· surnhit ihnt 
the DistJ·iet 'Comt and the :-:;chool Board should lw 
pPI'llHUH~ntly Jn·ohibitPd and rPstrained from prosecution 
of tlw condemnation adion. 
Rl'l'J~R, COWAN, llKt\TUOI) 
& l<'INLINRON 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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